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Human enhancement is the term used for applications of biomedical knowledge that 
aim to improve human form or functioning beyond what is necessary to restore or 
sustain good health. Genomics is one of the research-areas that promises to offer such 
possibilities in the near future, and body weight – especially over-weight and obesity - 
is one of the human characteristics at which these will be directed. This paper offers 
an overview of some of the moral issues that the subject of enhancement raises when 
related to obesity and genomics. After a brief discussion of the different perspectives 
on obesity and on the meaning of the term enhancement, a framework is presented in 
which the moral issues at stake are organised according to perspective on obesity 
(health or aesthetics) and moral outlook (distributive justice vs private morality). An 
inventory is made of the different ethical discussions that possible future genomics-
based options for the prevention or treatment of obesity and overweight may evoke. 
These include justice, obligations with regard to life-style, the limits of medical 
practice and the value of food and food-cultures. Finally, some speculations are made 




Research in genomics, at least in the popular image, holds the promise of great things 
to come – not only cures for diseases but perhaps also possibilities to improve and 
refine ourselves. The debate in bioethics on such possibilities, that have come to be 
known as “enhancement”, has been going on for almost a decade. Developments in 
genetic knowledge and techniques form an important impetus for this debate. In this 
contribution I intend to provide an overview of the widely diverging moral questions 
that the subject of enhancement can raise when related to obesity and genomics. After 
a brief discussion of the different perspectives on obesity and on the meaning of the 
term enhancement, I will present a framework to order the various moral issues at 
stake. I will make some assumptions about the kind of interventions that genomics 
research might provide us with in the future and then go on to make an inventory of 
the different ethical discussions that these future options for the prevention or 
treatment of obesity and obesity related health-problems may evoke. The intention is 
to offer a broad overlook of the field rather than an in-depth analysis of any one 
specific concern. 
 
Health and aesthetic perspectives on obesity 
 
Nowadays, obesity is seen mainly as a health problem, and especially a public health 
problem. Warnings about the obesity epidemic abound. There is some discussion as to 
whether obesity is a disease in itself, or whether it (merely) is an important risk-factor 
© ESRC Genomics Network.
            Genomics, Society and Policy 




Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.4, No.2 (2008) ISSN: 1746-5354 
37
for other diseases, such as cardio-vascular diseases, diabetes or arthrosis. Some 
critical commentators, however, have claimed that the health-risks of being obese are 
grossly overstated or even non-existent. 
 
Obesity and over-weight can be considered from another perspective as well, that of 
aesthetics or physical beauty. This aesthetic perspective on weight used to be stronger 
but recently appears to have been overtaken by the health-perspective, at least in 
public policy and perhaps also in the perception of many ordinary people. When 
obesity and overweight are considered from the aesthetic perspective, the remarkable 
different standards of physical beauty and bodily attractiveness of (especially the 
female) body stand out. Across cultures and over time, fatness has been appreciated 
quite differently. For example, in many less affluent societies - both past and present - 
a sizable posture is associated with wealth and therefore considered attractive. 
Another example is that Marilyn Monroe, the sex symbol of the nineteen fifties, 
would be considered “fat” by present-day standards. What is considered to be 
beautiful does not always align with what is considered to be healthy. Although in 
some communities being fat is seen as a sign of health, it can and does lead to serious 
health problems. On the other hand, the present-day Western female beauty-ideal 
tends to be so skinny, that it can become quite unhealthy. For example, supermodel 
Kate Moss has a BMI of around 15 (18.5-24.9 being the normal range). 
 
Obesity is often associated with a lack of self-discipline and the ideal nowadays 
appears to be “effortless thinness”. This reminds one of the old sin of gluttony. 
Thinness therefore tends to be seen not (only) as healthier, but also as morally better 
than obesity. Lately, the interest in the healthcare costs of obesity - estimated to be 
5.7% of the national health expenditure in the United States in 19982 - intensifies this 
view of obesity as morally reprehensible. If fat people are to be blamed for their 
fatness, they are also responsible for the concomitant costs of their condition. In a 
collective healthcare system these costs are partly paid for by people who are not 
obese themselves. In other words, or so this line of argument goes, obese people 
wrongfully burden non-obese people with their self-incurred healthcare costs. 
 
Finally, in the popular image, obese people are sometimes portrayed as sociable and 
enjoyable people, humorists who enjoy life and are “good company” (cf Roseanne 
Barr in her TV-show). However, as various sociological and psychological studies 
indicate, obese people are generally seen by the public as less attractive, and as having 
more negative personality traits than non-obese people. Prejudices abound and 
attitudes towards the obese are over all more negative than positive. Obese people are 
discriminated against in the areas of employment, education and healthcare. They 
have less chance to obtain jobs, are likely to earn less, and are considered to be lazy, 
indulgent, or even “repulsive” by a considerable percentage of nurses and medical 
students3. 
 
What is enhancement? 
 
Enhancement is a fairly recent concept in ethics, and is derived from the verb “to 
enhance” which means, according to Webster’s dictionary: “to heighten, to increase, 
especially: to increase or improve in value, quality, desirability or attractiveness.” 
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Though this broadly describes what enhancement is about, it is difficult to come up 
with an exact definition of what enhancement is, let alone to determine exactly which 
technologies, procedures or medications fall in this category and which do not. Is 
losing weight a form of enhancement? It might be for someone who is overweight, 
but it is definitely not so for an anorexia patient. And if you are obese, does losing 
weight count as a form of enhancement, or is it simply a cure for a disease? Does it 
matter by what means the weight-loss is brought about? Should dieting and exercise 
be seen as “enhancement technologies”? Should appetite-diminishing drugs, gene-
therapy, or implanted brain-electrodes4 be considered as such? 
 
Enhancement is often associated with making people “better than well” or going 
“beyond therapy”5. Enhancement is thus more than making people “better” in the 
sense of curing them, or restoring them “back to normal”. Enhancement is associated 
with reaching some state above or beyond the normal human condition, or with 
acquiring some capacities that are more-than-normal. But is the idea of being better 
than well applicable in the case of obesity, or more accurately, of weight? If not, using 
the term “enhancement” with regard to obesity appears inappropriate. Weight 
typically is a trait with an optimum, not a maximum quality. More (or less) weight is 
not always better; there is an optimal weight for everyone – enhancement in the sense 
of reaching an “even better” weight is simply impossible. Nevertheless, the term 
enhancement is also used for techniques and procedures that improve people in some 
way, even if this does not mean maximising a certain trait or capacity. Such 
improvements may either be improvements as compared to the average person, or as 
compared to the person’s own natural state. Some changes that are personal 
enhancements are mere “normalisations” when compared to the average of the 
population. 
 
The term enhancement is most often used with regard to physical traits of people, 
although mental capacities can also be the object of enhancement6. The means to 
enhancement – at least those means of enhancements that elicit ethical discussion – 
are most often bio-technological, and work through physical interventions in the 
body. Interventions that change the environment, or that change people through 
behavioural or cognitive therapy, for example, are not usually included in discussions 
about enhancement. Rather, these are seen as the kind of “natural” interventions that 
the “unnatural” and potentially problematic bio-technological enhancements are 
contrasted with. Although I do not agree with this overly simplistic view, I will follow 
this usage here and focus on interventions that aim at changing the body, not on those 
interventions directed to the environment or to personal behaviour7. 
 
According to Juengst, enhancement functions as a concept in two distinct discussions: 
first, the discussion on the proper limits of biomedicine (including discussions on the 
limits of medical practice, the proper role for doctors, and the funding of medical 
services), and second, the discussion on the ethics of self-improvement8. In the first 
context, enhancement serves as a boundary concept, marking off treatment from 
enhancement, or medical necessity from mere luxury. In the second context, the 
concept of enhancement functions more like a signpost, warning us for the various 
moral issues that are at stake in our quest for self-improvement. While the first 
discussion is clearly relevant for public policy - especially the distribution healthcare 
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services - this is not directly clear for the second discussion, which focuses more on 
personal morality and questions about the good life. In liberal societies these have 
traditionally been confined to the private sphere. This does not mean, however, that 
people do not worry or deliberate about such moral issues, nor that a public discussion 




If we combine the two important perspectives on obesity: the health perspective and 
the aesthetic perspective, with the two debates in which the concept of enhancement 
functions, we get a cross table of four distinct (though intertwined) moral debates. I 
will use this framework as a heuristic device to discuss the different moral questions 
that enhancement and obesity raise. Some of the moral questions clearly belong to one 
of the four boxes, while others show more overlap. In some cases, the box in which a 
certain question is placed depends on one’s presuppositions and one’s framing of the 
problem. As a rough division into four separate fields of debate, however, I believe 
the following scheme works well: 
 
 Health perspective Aesthetic perspective 
Discussion: Distributive 
justice & limits of health-
care  
 
Who should pay? 
 
Proper role of doctors? 
 
Discussion: Personal ethics 
 
Obligation to be healthy? 
 
 
Proper means and proper 
ends? 
 
In the next part of this article, I will discuss these four issues. First, however, let us 
look briefly at the possibilities that genomics research creates to actually influence 
human weight and weight-related health. Can genomics “enhance” our weight? 
Clearly, as set out in the previous section, it depends in part on the definition of 
enhancement whether any measures to influence people’s body weight or related 
health deserve the predicate “enhancement”. Another issue is whether genomics will 
enable us to influence body weight in new and unprecedented ways, or whether it will 
significantly change existing ways, either qualitatively or quantitatively. Genomics 
research will probably provide us with more insight in the human metabolism and in 
the (patho)genesis of obesity. It will also probably influence the way in which we 
understand and classify obesity, although it cannot be predicted at forehand how this 
will turn out. One perspective on obesity that is influenced by genomics research is 
the idea that the stockpiling of bodyfat in situations of affluence is part of a “natural” 
reaction of the human body, because a buffer stock of energy is very useful in times 
of scarcity. From an evolutionary perspective, the ability to store energy is very useful 
in situations in which the availability of food is uncertain and varying - as it was when 
humans were still hunter-gatherers. This is called the thrifty gene hypothesis9. 
According to this hypothesis, the amassment of body fat is a potentially useful 
phenomenon, a way for nature to deal economically with energy. This view that 
obesity can be the result of a natural mechanism, which is useful and healthy under 
certain circumstances, is at odds with the view of obesity as a disease, at least when 
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using a Boorsian concept of disease10. Boorsian concepts of disease rest on the idea of 
normal or natural bodily functions, which are disrupted in case of disease. Obesity 
might in this view constitute a risk factor for diseases but not a disease itself. The idea 
of an “obesogenic environment”11 also fits in this line of thought and opens up the 
possibility to see intervention directed to environmental factors that cause obesity as 
“medical” or “public health” interventions. 
 
What exactly genomics research will render for the prevention or treatment of obesity 
is as yet far from clear. What is clear is that some people have a stronger disposition 
to become obese than others – not only because of their behaviour or social 
environment, but also because of genetic factors and the way their metabolism works. 
Perhaps it will one day be possible to alter this genetic predisposition through, for 
example, gene therapy, and thus to prevent obesity. It may also become easier to treat 
already existing obesity and overweight through new types of medication and 
pharmacogenomics. Another possibility is that the outcomes of genomics research 
would enable us to reduce the health-risks of being obese, for example by intervening 
in the process of arteriosclerosis, or by reducing diabetogenic effects of obesity. This 
would enable people to be fat but relatively healthy, taking away an important reason 
to reduce weight. 
 
Because many ethical considerations with regard to obesity and genomics will depend 
on the details of the available prevention or treatment options, which are as yet 
unknown, I will here discuss some issues about the ethics of enhancement and obesity 
in a rather general sense. In doing so, I will sometimes anticipate or explore 
preventive or therapeutic interventions that are as yet non-existent. 
 
Four issues in enhancement and obesity 
 
1) Obesity from a health perspective / distributive justice 
The two main and intertwined issues in this field of discussion are: do prevention and 
or reduction of obesity belong to the realm of medicine? And: who should pay for 
these interventions? It is often assumed that medical necessary treatments should be 
paid for using some collective or public health funds, whereas only the individuals 
who desire them should pay for enhancements. Consequently, the classification of an 
intervention as either therapy or enhancement becomes crucial in answering the 
question of who is going to pay for interventions. It thus becomes crucial to settle the 
question of whether prevention and reduction of obesity count as medical treatment or 
as enhancement. 
 
At least some means of losing weight require medical intervention, such as gastric 
banding, or the use of fat-absorption blockers like Xenical. However, using medical 
means is not by itself enough reason to classify an intervention as properly belonging 
to the medical realm, or as eligible for public funding. Plastic surgery is a good 
example of this. In order to classify an intervention as treatment, the goals of the 
intervention count, too. 
 
Interventions to reduce bodyweight often have a medical goal instead of, or as well as, 
the aesthetic goal. Either the goal is a “cure” for obesity, or it is risk-reduction – 
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diminishing the health risks associated with obesity and severe overweight, like 
cardiac disease or diabetes. When obesity is understood as a disease, or as a serious 
risk-factor, losing weight must be understood as a form of medical treatment and not a 
matter of enhancement. In that case, it does belong to the medical realm and it should 
be paid from the general heathcare budget. 
 
This approach is in line with a common account to distinguish between medical 
treatment and enhancement, the so-called disease based account. The disease based 
account entails that all conditions diagnosed as disease by medical criteria should be 
treated. However, in the absence of any pathological, medical problem, interventions 
are considered not as treatment but as enhancement. This is a simple and appealing 
model, but unfortunately, it quickly runs into problems. 
 
First, the question of whether obesity is a disease or not, has not been answered 
definitively yet, and there is no consensus in the medical community. More 
fundamental, there are no uniform and uncontested criteria for what should be 
considered a “disease”. Different concepts of disease all have their problems and it is, 
moreover, likely that genomics will influence and change our concept of disease. 
 
Second, the disease-based account also has a problem with classifying prevention. 
Preventive medical interventions, like vaccinations, do not offer a cure for a 
diagnosed disease, and should therefore perhaps be considered enhancements. But 
that is not in line with current common practice. 
 
This problem also becomes obvious when obesity is not seen as a disease in itself, but 
as a risk-factor for getting certain diseases. On such a view, losing weight becomes a 
form of prevention, just like vaccination. Or perhaps losing weight is more aptly 
compared to other forms of risk-reduction, like quitting to smoke, or taking more 
exercise. It is not obvious that these belong in the medical realm or should be paid for 
by public means because, on the view that is currently dominant, there is an important 
voluntary behavioural aspect to these health-risks, and this implies individual 
responsibility. Genomics might (or might not) change this view and lead to less 
emphasis on the behavioural aspect and on less personal responsibility for being 
obese. A similar shift in focus appears to take place lately with regard to smoking, 
which is seen more and more as an addiction, for which one can have a genetic 
disposition. Since smoking has a (partly) genetic cause as well as negative health-
effects, it should be treated medically, according to some12. 
 
Another approach to the treatment-enhancement distinction in the context of 
healthcare funding is that of normal species functioning combined with a commitment 
to fair equality of opportunity13. Formal equality of opportunity means that all have 
equal rights, and effects of discrimination are corrected. Fair equality opportunity 
implies a “level playing field”, requiring compensation for effects of the social lottery 
(Rawls), as well as (in Daniels’ account) for some effects of the natural lottery. 
 
This approach turns the previous discussion on its head. Instead of establishing what 
counts as disease and what consequently counts as treatment, in order to determine 
what properly belongs to healthcare and should therefore be publicly funded, this 
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approach asks what kind of medical interventions we owe, as a matter of justice, to all 
members of society. It explains the moral importance of providing healthcare to all 
members of society and thus offers a rationale for the (public) provision of healthcare 
services. Health care should be distributed fairly, meaning that it should give citizens 
equal opportunities by restoring or improving their abilities to the range of functional 
capacities typical for members of their reference class. Healthcare is thus seen as one 
of society’s means to preserve equality of opportunity for its citizens. Although the 
distinction between interventions that should be provided and those that are mere 
“luxury” does usually align with the treatment-enhancement distinction, this is not 
always the case, as we will see. 
 
What does this imply for obesity? Does being obese impair the normal range of 
functioning? It can be argued that it often does. For example: it leads to a lower life 
expectancy, it leads to all kinds of diseases (like arthrosis) that in turn further limit 
normal functioning, and severely obese people cannot move around and do certain 
physical tasks as easily as slim people. Does obesity lead to unequal opportunities? 
Yes, it probably does. With a shorter life-expectancy, one does not have the same 
opportunities to lead a full human life; the physical impairments of being obese as 
well as the impairments of the associated diseases and social prejudices lead to less 
opportunity. On this account, obesity should be treated in order to restore the obese 
citizen back to a normal range of functioning and opportunity. 
 
However, this account overlooks one important aspect of the problem: the question of 
how the citizen became obese in the first place. If everyone starts out with a normal 
body weight and a normal opportunity to acquire food and to exercise, but some eat 
too much, move too little and become fat, why would society have to make up for the 
consequences of these individual choices in life-style? When obesity is considered to 
be a “freely chosen” condition, it provides a clear case in which the treatment-
enhancement distinction does not help to decide whether an intervention should be 
publicly funded. Although obesity may be a disease, and there may be a treatment for 
obesity, society is not obliged to provide it if the condition is self-inflicted. 
 
The situation would change if genomics would show that some people have a very 
strong disposition to become obese (perhaps through a combination of slow 
metabolism, inborn character-traits like impulsiveness or weak self-control and a high 
set-point for bodyweight-regulation established through a faulty diet in early infancy) 
and this disposition would itself be considered a disability or a disease. It would limit 
one’s opportunities to be so afflicted, because, for example, one would need to adopt 
a special eating and exercising-pattern. The relative importance or seriousness of such 
a limitation would of course be a matter of discussion, but it might support a claim to 
medical treatment of either the genetic disposition, or the resulting obesity. 
Alternatively, such a predisposition could be considered “normal”, but at the low end 
of the range of normal functioning. If it presented the same disadvantages as a “real” 
disease leading to obesity (for example a hormonal disbalance) it could be a matter of 
fair opportunity to “enhance” people with this genetic disposition14. This would be an 
example of a case where the treatment-enhancement distinction does not map onto the 
boundary between medical interventions that should be publicly funded and those that 
should not. 
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As a third possibility, such a disposition to become obese could also be considered as 
a mere variation in normal functioning and in normal skills and talents, in which case 
it would not support a claim for publicly funded treatment. After all, according to the 
fair equality of opportunity account, individual traits lying within the normal range of 
human functioning do not need to be equalized. This account does not require a 
levelling of all individual differences or a redistribution of all skills and talents. From 
this perspective, a medical intervention to alter a disposition to become obese would 
be considered an enhancement and not a treatment. It would enable one to live more 
easily (less need for exercise and dieting) than others with the same genetic make up 
who were not enhanced, but it would not be considered a matter of justice to provide 
people with this enhancement. 
 
2) Obesity from an aesthetic perspective / distributive justice 
When we see obesity and overweight as aesthetic issues, rather than as health-
problems, the questions concerning the treatment-enhancement distinction change. 
The main question here is: does weight reduction for aesthetic reasons belong to the 
medical realm; is it a task for doctors? The question of whether or not weight 
reduction for aesthetic reasons should be publicly funded is a minor question here 
because - as is obvious from the previous section - it is disease or abnormal 
functioning that entitle one to publicly funded interventions, not aesthetic 
considerations15. 
 
When no significant health issues are at stake, and weight loss is desired primarily for 
aesthetic reasons (think “overweight” rather than “obesity”) what role should the 
doctor play? Does it belong to his profession to help people to look nicer? Or should 
he only treat diseases and cure illnesses and refrain from enhancing or improving 
people? Such questions are familiar from the debate about aesthetic surgery. An 
important difference is that weight loss can be acquired through various means, both 
medical and non-medical, whereas aesthetic surgery always requires substantial 
medical intervention. Several considerations are relevant here. 
 
First, of course, the risks involved. Whereas there is little or no risk attached to life-
style advice, such as dietary rules or exercise programs, pharmaceutical interventions 
will probably have side-effects and risks attached to them. Whereas a professional 
balancing of risks and benefits in case of health-threatening obesity may end up 
favourably, it may turn out unfavourable if only aesthetic appearance, and not health, 
are involved. 
 
A related question is whether the balancing of risks and benefits is and should be a 
merely professional one. Should not the patient (or in this case perhaps better, the 
client) be allowed to make his or her own deliberations? In general, patients are 
allowed to refuse medical interventions if they do not agree with the doctor’s 
assessment of risks and benefits, but they cannot demand interventions that the doctor 
considers unprofessional. Especially in the case of enhancements, this means that 
doctors do not have to do everything their patients desire; and that sometimes it would 
even be unprofessional to do so. 
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A second important question is what the proper task or role of medicine is. Some say 
it is to treat diseases, others say it is to maintain or restore normal functioning; still 
others claim that it is to relieve suffering. On the first account, helping people lose 
weight for aesthetic reasons is not a task of doctors; on the last account it might be, if 
the person in question suffered a lot from her overweight. However, in that case, one 
would not be inclined to call the intervention a form of “enhancement”; rather it 
would be considered a form of treatment, just like correction of protruding ears is. In 
discussing the proper role of medicine and of doctors, the treatment-enhancement 
distinction is not proving very helpful. Rather, it appears to be a reformulation of the 
question. 
 
Finally, even if we could settle the dispute over the proper tasks of medicine, would 
that imply that doctors are never allowed to use their knowledge and skills for reasons 
outside this medical domain? Liposuction for moderately oversized thighs would 
probably not fall within any definition of the “proper tasks of medicine” but does that 
mean that doctors may not offer it to people, as they now do in all kinds of beauty-
centres and private clinics? I believe that apart from safety considerations there is 
little reason to prohibit this. Perhaps, though, we should admit that such practices 
have little to do with traditional medicine and are better understood as 
“schmedicine”16. Whereas doctors might feel morally obliged to stick to their core-
business, “schmocters” would have no such limitations; they would simply be 
entrepreneurs offering services based on biomedical knowledge and skills to 
consumers in a free market. Whatever the possibilities that genomics research is going 
to provide to keep one’s body in shape, they will probably all be used by these 
schmocters and their beauty-seeking clients. 
 
With the idea of schmocters as a new form of medical entrepreneurship, we have 
drifted a long way from the question of who should pay for the medical costs of 
weight loss for aesthetic reasons. In as far as reasons are purely cosmetic, collective 
funding seems out of the question. It would be labelled as an enhancement, in the 
sense of “mere luxury”, as opposed to medically necessary treatment. One way to 
avoid this conclusion would run via an appeal to psychological distress and suffering 
caused by the overweight. Just like some other cosmetic interventions are paid if they 
will alleviate suffering (the protruding ears), so an overweight person may claim a 
right to liposuction, an anti-fat pill, or a new genomics-based intervention, because he 
is suffering from his looks and experiences psychological distress because of them. 
Another way would be to appeal to the social disadvantages and unequal opportunities 
that being (severely) overweight brings with it, like decreased chances on the job-
market. These appeals would not stand much chance if the prevailing opinion would 
still be that overweight is one’s own fault and can best be remedied through diet and 
exercise. However, if overweight would come to be seen more as a matter of bad luck, 
for example by the discovery of a genetic dysfunction causing overweight, this would 
make a claim on some form of collectively-funded treatment, even for cosmetic, 
psychological and social reasons, a lot stronger. 
 
3) Obesity from an aesthetic perspective / personal ethics 
Since in our society being fat is often equated with being ugly, one way to enhance 
physical appearance is to lose weight. The billion-dollar industry surrounding body-
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shape techniques and weight-loss products shows how many people (especially 
women) are fighting with their own bodies to enhance their looks and improve their 
health. Any “easy fix” that genomics research might render for overweight would 
probably be welcomed. The moral discussions this provokes mainly concern 
“personal ethics”: questions about the good life, about virtues and about authenticity 
and freedom of choice. New genomics-based possibilities for preventing or treating 
overweight and obesity, and shifts in the way these conditions are perceived will also 
have repercussions for these moral discussions. 
 
A first concern in this field of discussion is that enhancing oneself through medication 
or technology is, indeed, an “easy fix”, and not as good or as worthy of respect as 
enhancement brought about by one’s own efforts17. With regard to bodyweight, our 
attitudes on this point seem to be very ambivalent. On the one hand, obesity is 
associated with gluttony, sloth, and lack of will power. As I will discuss more 
extensively below, this view is problematic from a moral perspective, because it 
stigmatises people based on prejudices and stereotypes18. Nevertheless it is a common 
view, and losing weight is therefore often not only perceived as a practical matter, but 
also a moral one. It is seen as a way to practise and show off the virtues of self-
discipline, moderation, determination and diligence. Losing weight should be done 
through effort and hard work: physical exercise and fierce self-restraint with regard to 
food. From this perspective, losing weight is a form of self-improvement through 
effort and virtue, and bypassing this route with the help of a pill or technology is felt 
to be morally inferior. 
 
On the other hand, however, the success of feeding substitutes, herbal extracts and 
other devices that promise instant thinness shows that we do not really feel this moral 
pull so strongly. We do not massively blame people for using these “easy fixes”. 
Perhaps, however, this is partly due to the fact that present pills and feeding 
substitutes merely promise but not really provide an easy fix. It does take effort, self-
restraint and will-power to continue most of the diets, food-substitute programmes 
and other slimming technologies. But how would our moral appraisal change if a 
really effective easy fix were to become available; if one could eat too much, too fatty 
food, and not exercise at all, and still remain thin through a pill? 
 
Another issue that is often raised concerning enhancement of physical appearance is 
that of voluntariness versus social pressure. It has often been remarked that beauty 
ideals can be oppressive and can lead to social exclusion of those who do not live up 
to them. Social pressure to use available techniques to enhance oneself and adapt 
one’s appearance to socially accepted norms might undermine the free choice of the 
person in question. This issue has been discussed extensively with regard to cosmetic 
operations and breast augmentations for women. A convincing argument has been 
made that although women are influenced by beauty-ideals this does not necessarily 
diminish their free or autonomous choice to use cosmetic surgery19. 
 
At present, social pressure to lose weight is usually not considered to be so serious as 
to compromise the free choice of people who decide to lose weight, though some 
supporters of the obesity movement argue that it does and that their choice to be fat 
and beautiful is not respected by society. Indeed, were more options to become 
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available to stay thin or lose weight easily, the more “abnormal” a fat figure would 
become. Social pressure to use all available means would then probably increase. 
 
A special feature of overweight that makes the issue of voluntariness somewhat less 
problematic than in the case of cosmetic surgery, is that (severe) overweight has 
negative health effects in addition to cosmetic disadvantages. Wanting to lose weight 
is not merely a matter of beauty and ever-changing fashion, but also a more objective 
matter of health. This means that fat people have some reason to want to lose weight, 
apart from any fashion norms or related social pressure. Imagine, however, that the 
outcomes of genomics research would somehow make it possible to reduce the 
detrimental health effects of obesity so that one could be both fat and healthy. In that 
case, the health argument for losing weight would disappear, and the aesthetic 
argument would be the only one left. This would most likely shift the discussion on 
free choice and social pressure. Either being fat would not be considered to be so bad 
anymore, since it would no longer cause serious health-risks, or it would still be 
considered as deviant and un-aesthetic, despite it not being a health risk anymore. In 
the first event, social pressure to lose weight would diminish; in the second case, 
social pressure would remain high but would be more problematic than before, since 
it would rest only on social and aesthetic norms. 
 
At the other end of the weight-spectrum, social pressure is also often claimed to be a 
problem. It is claimed that beauty norms and social pressure influence young girls’ 
eating and dieting behaviour unfavourably, and affect the prevalence of anorexia 
nervosa. Apart from the question of whether this claim is justified, it is not clear that it 
is the social pressure itself that is most problematic here. Young girls’ decisions to 
have tattoos or to “pierce” various body-parts are probably made under the same kind 
of social pressure, but this is not seen as very morally problematic. Rather, the 
question is whether the norm of thinness is not a “suspect norm”, based on 
discrimination or prejudices and with detrimental effects. 
 
Norms of appearance are morally suspect, according to Margaret Little, “when their 
content reflects, flows from, and reinforces a system of beliefs, attitudes, and practices 
that together involve deep injustice”20. She gives the examples of racial prejudice (the 
norm that a whiter skin is better than a darker one) and gender stereotypes (a good 
woman is a good-looking woman). Is thinness, in this sense, a suspect norm? Does the 
norm of slenderness reflects or flows from a system of injustice towards fat people? 
Does it reinforce such an unjust system? I believe that this depends partly on the 
degree to which health, aesthetics, and prejudices are involved here and partly on the 
degree to which fat people can be held responsible for being fat. 
 
In as far as obesity poses serious health risks and people generally want to be healthy, 
there is nothing inherently unjust in having a social norm that favours thinness. In as 
far as the norm of thinness is based on aesthetic reasons, it also need not be unjust; 
norms of physical beauty and attractiveness always favour some people over others, 
but as Little remarks21, this is not unjust but merely unfortunate for the less endowed. 
Aesthetic or beauty norms, however, tend to be different and often stricter for women 
than for men and in that sense can be unjust. Women are judged more on their looks 
than men are, and the norm of thinness reflects this. 
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Perhaps the most “suspect” aspect of the norm of thinness is that it incorporates ideas 
about behaviour and character of obese or overweight people as well as negative 
attitudes towards them. As mentioned before, obesity is associated with notions of 
guilt, sin, and weakness of will. Judgements of appearance thus tend to become 
judgements of behaviour and character at the same time. People are often considered 
responsible for their obesity or overweight, while in fact they often have less control 
over their own weight than others think. There are genetic, but also social, 
psychological and socio-economic factors that play significant roles. Individual 
behaviour is important, but it is not easy to change one’s lifestyle. Losing weight can 
be a real struggle that takes effort and will-power even if it is in the end unsuccessful. 
Also, some people may indeed choose to stay fat because they like eating and dislike 
exercise; this may be a lifestyle choice that has nothing to do with “weakness” or bad 
character22. On any account, it is unfair to stigmatise people and draw conclusions 
regarding their character based on their appearance. I believe this aspect of the norm 
of thinness is indeed suspect, but it is very difficult to disentangle it from the aspects 
of health and aesthetics. 
 
Finally, it must be recognized that the norm of thinness tends to function in practice in 
a “suspect” fashion. It is clearly unjust to discriminate against fat people in the 
workplace, at school or in other social institutions where a person’s weight and 
appearance are irrelevant for his performance or functioning, but it clearly happens23. 
The health and beauty-based norm of a slender appearance then oversteps its proper 
limits and becomes a discriminating norm. 
 
When a norm is “suspect”, techniques and measures to help people to conform to this 
norm can be accused of being complicit with the unjust system, and of exacerbating 
prejudice and discrimination. By bleaching one’s dark skin in order to look whither, 
for example, one acts as an accomplice to a system that discriminates dark-skinned 
people. Once again, as long as health is clearly involved, measures against severe 
obesity cannot easily be accused of being complicit with an unjust and discriminatory 
system24. We should be careful, however, that the justification of the norm of thinness 
in terms of health does not overstep its limits. By treating even slight overweight the 
same as obesity, despite the fact that overweight poses no or only limited health risks, 
the mainly cosmetic problem of overweight is turned into a medical problem. 
Moreover, new (genomics-based) options to reduce weight could be accused of 
complicity if they were marketed as means to improve appearance in people - most 
likely women - with normal weight or slight overweight, with an appeal to gender-
biased beauty norms, or if they contributed to stigmatisation by stressing individual 
behaviour and character. 
 
4) Obesity from a health perspective / personal ethics 
When obesity is considered from the perspective of personal ethics and health, the 
question of enhancement can be rephrased as follows: is there a moral obligation to 
enhance our own health; and if so, how much effort is required and which means are 
appropriate? Here, issues of responsibility for health and the value of health relative to 
other values are important. 
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In liberal societies, people are entitled to live according to their own views of the 
good life, and this implies that people can live according to diverging value patterns. 
Health is often seen as a basic value, because it is a precondition to realize most other 
values or aims in life. Bad health usually decreases one’s life expectancy and also 
one’s quality of life and whatever one’s view of the good life, these are prima facie 
bad things. It can therefore be expected that people, as a mater of prudence, look after 
their health. However, this does not imply that health is always more important than 
other things, or that one should always do everything in one’s power to stay healthy. 
Rather, one will always have to balance the value of health, and the effort it costs to 
maintain or regain health, against other values and aims in life. For example, a nurse 
tending on influenza-patients puts her own health at risk, but does so because it is her 
task and her responsibility. The aim of looking after the sick and doing a good job is 
more important than preventing every possible risk to her own health. A gourmand 
may well find the pleasures of eating more important than the health risks of being 
over-weight. And anybody with a sedentary job and a busy working-schedule might 
find his career, his family or his rare spare time more important than spending hours 
in the gym to do healthy exercises. 
 
Taking care of one’s health is more a matter of prudence and lifestyle than of 
morality; a matter of personal choice, rather than a public duty. It can be reframed as a 
matter of public morality, however, when other people are made to pay for one’s 
carelessness regarding one’s health, as can be the case in collectively funded 
healthcare systems. This brings us back to the issues of distributive justice discussed 
earlier. Moreover, a condition like obesity can become a public problem if it exists on 
such a massive scale that social interactions and relationships are disrupted. In the 
United States, almost 30% of obese people hardly leave their homes anymore because 
of their obesity25. 
 
A very important question is how much we are willing to do to enhance our health: 
how much value do we attach to it as compared to other things, and how much effort 
do we want to invest in it? With regard to obesity and overweight, it has been 
remarked that the “war on obesity” and the extreme emphasis on the health-aspects of 
food and drink repress attention for other aspects of eating26. For example, the social 
dimension of eating and drinking may become neglected when food is merely seen as 
potentially fattening – it is not much fun going out to dinner with someone who is on 
a bread-and-lettuce diet. Another example is that specific eating cultures of various 
countries or ethnic groups may be suppressed for reasons of health: the Mediterranean 
kitchen is said to be healthy, but traditional Dutch cuisine should be banned from our 
tables because it contains too much fat meat and gravy. Moreover, production norms 
intended to reduce health risks can lead to prohibition of certain products, such as 
certain farm-made cheeses. Health risks are then deemed more important than the 
pleasure of eating well. For some gourmands “enhancing” health by deleting all kinds 
of exquisite food and drink from the menu would result in a diminished rather than 
enhanced quality of life. 
 
For most seriously obese people, however, their weight has probably little to do with 
conscious choices, based on a balancing of values. They do not risk their health 
because they find eating so much more important than health, or because they 
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consciously choose a life plan requiring little exercise, but because they cannot resist 
the temptation, because the lack knowledge about healthy food, because they have a 
slow metabolism, because they live in a obesogenic environment, or because of a 
number of other possible reasons. So, while the social and cultural risks of over-
emphasising the health risks of overweight or of certain food-patterns, and of 
medicalizing eating and drinking behaviour, should certainly be addressed, they 
should be evaluated in relation to the serious problems that obesity brings about. 
 
Finally, I want to point out one more issue related to personal views on the good life, 
responsibility and health: the concern for children. Making health- and lifestyle-
related decisions for our selves is one thing, but what about our children? Making 
lifestyle decisions that affect their health is quite something else. Parents are 
responsible (a typical form of role-responsibility) for their children, a responsibility 
that obviously includes the children’s health and weight. Of course, other parties such 
as the government, schools, healthcare institutions or food-manufacturers have a 
responsibility here as well, but the primary moral responsibility for children rests with 
the parents. A healthy diet and healthy exercise habits are learned in childhood and 
obesity acquired at a young age has serious health consequences later in life. While 
passing on one’s value patterns to one’s children is an important part of the 
upbringing, and parents are to a large extent free to raise their children according to 
the value patterns that they prefer, parents are not free to make choices for their 
children that seriously harm them or significantly impair their options in life. This 
goes for choices that lead to obesity in children, but also for possible enhancements in 
children or future children (think of genetic modification or genetic selection)27. If 
medication became available to prevent or easily cure obesity, this might present 
parents with difficult dilemmas. Why deny your child snacks and sweets if there is 
medication to help him keep a proper weight? But on the other hand, why expose your 
child to possible side effects if you could also teach him a healthy lifestyle? Even 
harder questions are raised by possibilities for prenatal genetic testing or pre-
implantation genetic screening. If these techniques could identify embryos or foetuses 
with a high risk of becoming obese, how should parents, physicians and policymakers 
deal with that? Is preventing obesity in this way an acceptable way to enhance (the 
health of) our offspring? 
 
One step further: eugenics? 
 
Before I come to my conclusions, I would like to make some speculations and raise 
some questions regarding enhancement, genomics and obesity that are more futuristic 
than the previous reflections. Up until this point, I have tacitly assumed that whatever 
intervention would become available to prevent or cure obesity it would be used on an 
individual basis. However, some already speculate about more profound changes we 
might one day be able to make in our genome and thus in large groups of people, 
perhaps even our whole species. Suppose we could change our genome in such a way 
that we would be less prone to obesity, would this count as an enhancement? Would it 
be morally acceptable - or perhaps even morally required - to enhance our offspring 
by genetically engineering immunity to the obesogenic environment they will come to 
live in? 
© ESRC Genomics Network.
            Genomics, Society and Policy 




Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.4, No.2 (2008) ISSN: 1746-5354 
50
If we accept the “thrifty genotype hypothesis”, which states that through evolution we 
have developed survival mechanisms against periods of food scarcity, it could be 
argued that a natural trait that is useful under some circumstances has now “turned 
against us” and is causing obesity. Our genes have stayed the same, but our 
environment has changed from one of scarcity to affluence28. Ravussin claims that 
obesity has in our present environment become an “essential condition”, and states 
that “what was an asset in early mankind history has now rapidly become a 
liability”29. 
 
From this perspective, it would be an enhancement if we were to change our natural 
predisposition for economic energy-use to a more lavish use of energy. We would be 
able to eat as much (or more) than we do now, and move just as little, without 
becoming fat. We would not have to change our lifestyle to maintain a healthy body, 
but we would change our bodies to fit our lifestyle. Since this could be viewed as a 
way to adapt ourselves better to our present needs and environment it could be 
understood as a form of self-evolution30. 
 
Apart from safety concerns - which would probably be massive - would this be a 
morally problematic form of enhancement? Would this somehow make us less 
human, or post-human; and if so, would that be a bad thing? Would such 
enhancements be purchased on an individual basis and would they perhaps only be 
affordable for the wealthy upper class? Or would they be provided and promoted as a 
public health measure to be used by all? 
 
On a more fundamental level: is it wrong to “play God” like this, or to aim to change 
what nature has made us? There will certainly be people who will claim that it is. But 
why would we not adapt ourselves to new circumstances and aid our own evolution a 
bit? Is it morally better to control and alter our circumstances, rather than adapt our 
bodies? 
 
And from a quite different perspective: would changing our genome to make us fat-
resistant be a fair thing to do in global perspective – would it be just towards all those 
people who have too little to eat, instead of too much? 
 
These will be left open questions here, intended to show that there is much ethical 
discussion about enhancement beyond the questions I already raised. It is, however, 
not likely that we will have the option of designing and altering our genome at will 
available to us in the near future. Minor interventions, such as new medications, or 
genetic profiling and life-style advices, are much more likely to be developed. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
I have discussed some of the ethical issues related to obesity and human enhancement 
using a rough division into four problem-fields. It is clear, however, that this 
subdivision is not absolute and that there are connections and correspondences 
between the various discussions. 
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Many of the questions discussed above are situated on the intersection of public and 
private morality. While people should be allowed to make their own choices and live 
(and eat) according to their own value patterns, it is clear that both eating behaviour 
and body weight are not strictly private matters, but issues of public concern as well. 
They are so most obviously because of public health concerns and the issue of fair 
distribution of healthcare costs, but also because of the cultural and social effects of 
an obesity-epidemic. These other-regarding effects of individual lifestyles place 
weight, eating and exercising issues on the borderline between private and public 
morality. 
 
For many ethical issues, the demarcation between the health and the aesthetic 
perspective is important, but it is also clear that this is a contested and not always 
clear division. Health and aesthetic considerations do sometimes overlap or coincide, 
but can also diverge. Moreover, the developments in genomics may change the health 
and aesthetic perspectives, as well as their mutual relationship. The powers that 
genomics research will give us to intervene in the human body, as well as the changes 
it will bring about in (public) perception and attitude towards obesity and overweight, 
are not easily predicted and might go in many directions. Nevertheless, the ethical 
discussions that efforts to enhance people’s weight and weight-related health will 
evoke will probably fall somewhere in the framework that I have sketched. Which of 
these ethical issues will prove most pertinent and what exactly the outcomes of the 
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